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Financing Early Intervention: Interim Paper 
Graham Allen Review 
 
Introduction 
1. Part 1 of this review has set out the importance of Early Intervention, both in 
terms of improved social outcomes and economic benefits to the public sector. 
Acting early to prevent problems occurring in the future with children, young 
people, and families will help to greatly reduce future public spending on tackling 
the problems later. There is a strong cost-benefit rationale for intervening at the 
earliest possible stage- the earlier the intervention in a child‟s life, the more cost 
effective it is. Additionally the cost of not intervening is far greater through not 
acting, Government is committing to paying out billions of pounds in the future in 
addressing more serious problems. 
2. Early Intervention is defined as: “those programmes which ensure that babies, 
children, and young people build the social and emotional bedrock to fulfil their 
potential and reduce dysfunction. This is a prerequisite to break the 
intergenerational cycle of dysfunction and underachievement.” Waiting for a child 
to reach school age before any problems are identified or addressed is simply too 
late, as by that stage most of the damage is already done. 
3. This short document sets out the areas of focus for Part 2 of the review, which 
will report in May/June 2011. Over the next few months we will be exploring 
options to improve the financing of Early Intervention programmes. This will 
include a particular focus on attracting additional private sector investment into 
those programmes which best deliver outcomes, whilst at the same time 
recognising the barriers that need to be addressed within the public sector. This 
is because we believe that greater scale and financial sustainability can be 
achieved through drawing on external sources of investment. Our final 
recommendations will therefore set out a full range of financial mechanisms that 
could help to attract additional investment, both internally and externally to Early 
Intervention. 
4. Part 1 of this review also set out recommendations for an Early Intervention 
Foundation. Considering how this institution might best facilitate and support 
greater financial investment will also be a key line of enquiry in our work over the 
next few months, alongside the specific financial mechanisms. 
5. We are in the early stages of this second phase of the review. Therefore this 
document does not set out any recommendations, but rather flags the direction of 
our work over the coming months. Whilst we have already started working with 
representatives from the financial community, we are interested to hear from 
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others who might wish to contribute. Details for doing so are set out at the end of 
this document.  
 
 
The problem we are trying to solve 
 
6. The hypothesis is that if the Government spends only a small amount on early 
intervention programmes now (blue circle in diagram below), there will need to be 
greater expenditure in future spending review (SR) periods to address more serious 
problems (e.g. as children develop behavioural issues and become disruptive at 
school, grow up to be prisoners, teenage mothers, alcoholics – shown by the red 
circles below): 
 
 
 
 
         SR1              SR2    SR3 
7. However if we were to invest more in Early Intervention now (yellow circle), the 
expenditure in future SR periods will be less (green circles): 
 
 
 
 
                  SR1              SR2    SR3 
8. Given that spending for the current SR period has already been allocated however, 
additional finance will need to be sought in order to achieve this. This could come 
from additional public sector borrowing, or alternatively from private or VCS 
investment, which could include a mixture of different sources of finance. These may 
be external investors seeking a return.  
9. Given that the additional investment will result in Government savings in future SR 
periods, the Government could choose to incentivise investors by paying them a 
return out of the future savings. In order to work out how much Government could 
afford to pay, and still benefit from the savings, the shaded areas in the diagram 
below will need to be quantified.  
Additional investors    Returns to investors 
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Public sector Barriers:  
10. Early Intervention is particularly challenging for the public sector for a number of 
reasons: 
 Longer-term uncertainty. Early Intervention often requires long time periods 
before the benefits are seen (i.e. preventing a child from committing anti-social 
behaviour, growing up into an alcoholic or from having a teenage pregnancy 
later in life). This means that the public sector needs to be able to focus on 
longer delivery timescales when investing in programmes. However public 
sector organisations usually receive finite resources to spend over a relatively 
short budget cycle that rarely stretches beyond 3 years. Pressure to show 
results within the budget period can mean short term programmes are 
sometimes preferred to those with longer term benefits. Public sector delivery 
bodies often do not know whether they will continue to receive resources, 
again resulting in programmes which generate benefits quickly being 
preferred. Alongside this, we will need to consider how we can best overcome 
some of the uncertainty in the public sector, for instance by securing cross-
party buy-in to Early Intervention policy. This would help to reduce the impact 
of political change on policy delivery, and to provide greater certainty to 
investors. 
 Reactive approach. Preventative measures are sometimes seen as an 
optional „nice to have‟ - it is often easier to prioritise finite resources towards 
those who are already affected by serious problems, rather than those who 
might face them in the future. This is particularly so in the current tight fiscal 
situation meaning that the public sector ends up taking a more reactive 
approach than it might otherwise do, and lends itself less towards longer-term 
investments in Early Intervention. Additionally there are often statutory 
obligations which require a reactive and sometimes costly approach, leaving 
the public sector with no option but to prioritise resources for these (putting 
children into care for instance, or certain parts of the criminal justice system). 
 Risk aversion. The perceived lack of a clear track record of delivery of Early 
Intervention programmes in the UK means that there is a challenge in 
demonstrating the positive effects of programmes, at least in the shorter term. 
As programmes are developed and tested more widely, there will be greater 
clarity over those programmes which really deliver change and are robustly 
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evaluated. However, this may take a bit of time.  In a world of finite resources 
and fiscal consolidation, public sector organisations are likely to be prioritise 
those programmes which are seen to be less „risky‟ which deliver outcomes 
during their budget cycle.  
 Complex Organisational silos at national & local level - Early Intervention 
programmes frequently involve a large number of delivery organisations with 
different areas of focus – health, crime prevention, education, to name a few. 
This means that there is less of an incentive for an individual organisation to 
invest in such programmes, as the benefits may well accrue to someone else. 
This implies that they should instead invest collectively in programmes which 
benefit multiple organisations. However each organisation will usually have its 
own budgeting mechanisms and strict rules that accompany these. For 
instance different public sector bodies will have different rules governing their 
ability to borrow money, and have different reporting structures, which operate 
at distinct levels within their organisation. The picture becomes yet more 
complicated when considering the national and local delivery frameworks, 
which again operate differently within their fields. Therefore reaching 
agreement to invest across different organisations at different levels becomes 
difficult. There are solutions within the public sector that are currently being 
developed – community budgets are a good example of this at local level. 
Community budgets will help to explore for instance investment and savings 
accruing to different organisations. Creation of a financial vehicle or 
mechanism that operates across these silos is therefore attractive, and needs 
to be explored at both national and local levels. 
11. Addressing these barriers will be an important part of our recommendations, 
helping to encourage greater investment in Early Intervention by the public 
sector.  
12. It may mean helping public sector bodies better be able to prioritise investment in 
Early Intervention from within their existing budgets, for instance through tools 
such as community budgets or looking at local government borrowing rules. It 
may also mean considering whether Government itself needs to raise additional 
finance. For instance, we will explore options for Government bonds. 
13. It may be the case however that simply finding extra public sector money will not 
be sufficient in bringing about culture change. New ways of working will be 
needed if we are to improve the development and delivery of Early Intervention 
programmes, and for this external finance may be needed. 
 
Why external finance is needed 
14. Whilst addressing the public sector barriers will be an important part of the 
review, we believe that Government acting on its own might not be sufficient in 
securing adequate finance. The aim of our work is not to shift the burden of 
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responsibility onto the private and VCS sectors, but rather to acknowledge that 
there exist certain limitations which mean that the public sector would achieve 
better outcomes for children and young people with the support of others. Some 
would argue that even if greater investment is found from within the public sector 
itself, this will not necessarily bring about the culture change needed. More 
money does not always mean better delivery of outcomes, and new ways of 
encouraging innovation are needed. External finance may be able to help trigger 
the necessary change, through driving greater competition for example. A 
successful approach will address the public sector barriers, in parallel to drawing 
in external finance. 
15. In the shorter term in particular spending has already been allocated, and so 
additional external finance will be required in order to enable more immediate 
investment in Early Intervention.   
16. There are already some emerging models in social policy that have successfully 
attracted external investment (such as Social Impact Bonds), although these 
have almost exclusively been drawn from Charitable foundations or philanthropist 
investors on an ad hoc or grant basis. But charitable investment is often provided 
in on an ad hoc or grant basis.  
17. Bringing in external finance could also have the following additional benefits: 
 Promoting competition and driving innovation –Bringing in external 
investment will incentivise those delivering services to compete to receive the 
investment, which in turn should help to drive up standards. Early Intervention 
is an area of policy which requires a particularly innovative approach given the 
multiple areas of impact and longer timescales involved. Drawing on external 
sources can represent a new way of delivery, and thus encourage greater 
innovation.   
 Risk sharing. Whilst ensuring that a more robust approach to evidence is 
taken in delivery of programmes (as described in Part 1), private sector 
investors may be more accustomed to a returns-based approach where there 
is an element of challenge/risk involved. Bringing in private and VCS sectors 
finance therefore allows the public sector to share or transfer this challenge or 
risk, particularly if a „payment by results‟ approach is applied (the public sector 
pays a return to investors only if the programme delivers successful results).  
 Skills & Resource – Sometimes private sector organisations have greater 
skills, systems or resources already in place. So for instance they might have 
particular IT systems already in place, meaning that the public sector does not 
need to set one up from scratch. This can result in greater efficiency. 
 Immediate resource – The recent spending review process has now closed, 
and spending limits for each Department are now set. This means that 
additional public sector investment is unlikely to be unlocked prior to the next 
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spending review period starting in 2015. Therefore attracting external finance 
in the interim will be essential if we are to act now on Early Intervention.  
18. Involving the private sector however must be done in an appropriate manner. The 
National Audit Office set out the following in their 2009 report, „Private Finance 
Projects‟: 
“Private finance brings costs and risks over the use of conventional funding. Part of 
the cost difference is because, unlike Government borrowing, the cost of private 
finance reflects the risks of the project. So projects which use more expensive, risk-
weighted, private finance must also bring sufficient benefits to be worthwhile. These 
benefits might include cost efficiencies, quality improvements, innovation or the better 
management of risk. It is important to establish how these will be achieved before the 
project is initiated. 
Each project requires a business case that demonstrates that the project is feasible, 
affordable and VFM. Although business cases generally demonstrate feasibility and 
affordability they often do not manage to demonstrate adequately that private finance 
is the best VFM option.” 
19. We will ensure that any specific mechanism recommended in this review sets out 
clearly the case for private sector involvement – including in terms of value for 
money. 
20. In summary however, we believe that external finance will help to bring about 
more immediate funding for Early Intervention, and will enable greater transfer of 
risk out of the public sector. If the total amount of savings which the public sector 
will receive can be shown to be significantly greater than the cost of external 
finance, then it should be possible to demonstrate value for money.  
 
What innovative finance options already exist? 
21. Within preventative & social policy there are a number of innovative financial 
models emerging in support of social outcomes: 
o The most recent example is the Social impact Bonds established by the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in Peterborough. This model seeks external 
investment for reduced rates of reconviction within a cohort of prisoners. 
Repayment of this investment is conditional on MoJ making savings from 
reduced offending, greater efficiency, coordination and innovation, as a 
result of specific programmes delivered with the prisoners. The MoJ model 
provides encouragement that an appropriate model could be developed to 
attract additional investment. The challenge will be for the MoJ pilot to 
demonstrate cashable savings for Government at the end of the pilot 
period, and to attract commercial investors. We will consider whether the 
social impact bond model could be applied to Early Intervention, and how 
to overcome any barriers. 
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o Additionally the Big Society Bank is being established to improve 
investment in social enterprise, providing wholesale funding to 
intermediaries. We will fully explore the links with the Big Society Bank in 
our work, ensuring that there is no duplication between any institutions 
established. It is likely that any new Early Intervention institution would 
operate as a new player in the market which the Big Society Bank is aiming 
to develop and support. 
o The Government announced plans last year to encourage mutuals & 
cooperatives in the public sector. We will consider whether these public 
sector „spin-offs‟ could provide the opportunity to attract greater external 
finance into delivery of Early Intervention. 
o There are currently 16 places doing community budgets, focused around 
families with complex needs that pool various strands of Whitehall funding 
into a single bank account. Ministers have expressed the aim to have the 
model extended to all areas by 2014. We will consider what role this type 
of structure could play in helping to overcome some of the challenges of 
investing in Early Intervention programmes across organisational 
boundaries, and additionally whether they might be suited to bringing in 
private sector finance. 
22. In addition, there are other areas of public sector policy which are currently 
designed to attract private investment. PFI is the most obvious example of this. 
PFI enables the public sector to contract with the private sector on a long-term 
basis to deliver large infrastructure programmes. Because of its long-term nature, 
PFI could provide some helpful lessons regarding payment to investors over 
longer time periods. Similarly, we will also explore the use of Joint Ventures (JVs), 
where both the public sector and the private sector contribute to a commercial 
venture on a joint basis (and are often used in PFI). 
 
Potential Obstacles 
23. In Part 2 of the review, we will explore a number of financial mechanisms that 
could help to attract external investment to Early Intervention. However, there are 
a number of challenges specific to Early Intervention that we will need to address 
as part of this, if we are to successfully widen our means of external support and 
funding: 
 Clear metrics and savings - the difficulty in establishing clear metrics on 
which to determine payments to investors. In particular there is a need to 
demonstrate that savings are additional to that which would have been 
achieved in the absence of the intervention, in order to help quantify how 
much of a return Government can afford to pay to investors. This will be 
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necessary in order to justify any returns paid, which in turn need to be set at a 
level attractive enough for investors.  
 Establishing cashable savings – In order to justify savings being paid out to 
investors as a return, there is a need to demonstrate that the savings are 
„cashable‟ to a significant enough scale and on a sustainable basis. Normally 
this means that something needs to stop being delivered, in order to “free up” 
the savings (i.e. less care workers are needed, or a prison is shut down as it is 
no longer needed). There will also need to be sufficient transparency and 
safeguards, ensuring that savings accrued are not all spent on other areas 
instead as this would prevent any payment to investors.  
 Payment Complexity – the multiple beneficiaries of Early Intervention policies 
could make any new payment structure complex, if savings accrue to a range 
of different Government organisations. This will extend to issues such as data-
sharing across different organisations, which will need to be addressed in 
order to determine success measures. This needs to be addressed at both 
national and local level. 
 Budgeting Complexity - lack of long-term budgeting framework at 
Departmental or local level makes it difficult to make financial commitments 
outside of normal planning horizons. 
 Political Complexity – Early Intervention needs to be championed across all 
of the political parties, both at local and central level, to reduce uncertainty of 
policy delivery and resultant financial payouts. The three main political parties 
endorsed the first report, and ensuring cross-party support will be a key 
feature of our recommendations in the final report.  
 Long Repayment Timescale –the long time scales required to fully see the 
benefits of Early Intervention (and therefore receive payment for successful 
delivery) could make it unattractive for investors. Finding some means of 
providing milestone payments will be necessary, as investors will usually want 
to see some sort of return within a couple of years. 
 Fragmented Provider Market – Early Intervention programmes rely on often 
small voluntary organisations. These can be poorly capitalised, and may 
struggle to scale up to the challenge of delivering Early Intervention and 
demonstrate a robust track record to justify support and resources.  
 Delivery incentives – Any new mechanism needs to incentivise both 
investors to take on the risk of delivery (through the level of return they 
receive), and incentivise those delivering services. In the case of Early 
Intervention, those investing are unlikely to want to play an active role in 
delivery or monitoring of delivery. We will also need to ensure that any 
mechanism does not create perverse incentives. So for instance, it should 
avoid the incentive for investors „cherry-pick‟ those individuals whom it is 
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easiest to achieve success with. A mechanism which provides maximum 
payment for minimum effort will need to be avoided. 
 
Criteria for any intervention 
24. Any new mechanisms proposed should not jeopardise the protection of sound 
public finances, and in particular protect against risks for the taxpayer:  
 Value for money – Options which involve borrowing from the private sector 
at a significantly more expensive rate then gilts are unlikely to be appealing 
to Government, unless significant additional benefits can be demonstrated. 
Demonstrating that the financial benefits (future savings) of Early 
Intervention are significantly greater than the cost of using private finance 
now (including any interest) will be key. Transfer of risk or additional 
competition encourages could also help to justify the cost to the public 
sector.  
 Avoid spending control risks – Whilst we will evidently need to establish 
a means of being able to pay investors a return over a potentially long time 
period, we need to be careful when designing a new system which creates 
future commitments for expenditure at a future date and pressures on future 
budgets (although it could be argued that by not acting preventatively now, 
Government is creating future spending commitments where it will have to 
later spend to tackle problems). Ideally we should investigate options for 
enabling money to be set aside or ring-fenced in a transparent manner, for 
the purposes of making payments to investors. There is a particular need to 
ensure there is sufficient transparency, so that any savings accrued are not 
simply all spent on another area instead. Avoiding this would create a 
spending risk, as it would prevent payments from being made to investors 
out of the savings accrued. Transparency of potential costs will additionally 
be of particular importance for any mechanism which is off-balance sheet. 
For instance, Government publishes the details of all PFI projects where 
they are off balance sheet.   
 Meet fiscal and accountancy requirements – Our recommendations 
should avoid placing burdens on the Government balance-sheet, 
particularly at a time when Government is working to reduce the fiscal 
deficit. It may be however that additional borrowing now by the public sector 
at a time when Government is trying to reduce the fiscal deficit, may be less 
attractive than making future payments to investors over a longer 
timeframe. Government guarantees, whilst they inevitably help to reduce 
cost of returns, are unlikely to be a realistic option for Government in the 
current environment. 
 
What investors need? 
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25. Part 2 of the review will need to consider how best to make external investment 
mechanisms more attractive for both public & external investors: 
26. We believe that investors need:  
 Clear metrics – from which to drive performance and returns 
 Attractive returns from a Government backed revenue stream, both in terms of 
the timescale they are offered over (possibly with interim milestones), and the 
level of financial incentive. Some investors may be more focused on receiving 
a financial return, whilst others will be happy to receive less of a return if they 
know they are contributing to greater social outcomes.   
 Improved confidence in any new asset class – likely to be achieved through 
pilots that demonstrate success  
 Clarity over risk – ensuring that investors are able to weigh up the relative 
risks and rewards 
 Market creation – to provide investors with confidence about liquidity 
 Certainty – a product which minimises scope for Government to change its 
mind 
 
Financial mechanisms 
27. There are a number of parallels with financing a business, which can be 
applicable here. For instance, organisations can apply for loans, issue bonds, or 
shares in their company. Building on models already known and in existence, 
and considering how these could be adapted and applied in the field of Early 
Intervention will form the initial basis of our investigations. It may be that including 
an element of Early Intervention in an already existing product may be most 
appropriate, particularly in addressing investor appetite. Alternatively, a 
completely new stand-along mechanism may be more appropriate. 
 
a. Payment by results (PBR) 
28. The Public Spending criteria suggest that a mechanism which pays any dividend 
or interest to the private sector should be focused on rewarding successful 
delivery of outcomes. This is often referred to as „payment by results‟, meaning 
that the provider only receives a payment if they have successfully delivered 
outcomes. This ensures that the private sector takes on the risk for delivery, and 
strengthens the VFM case. It also helps to ensure a greater focus on metrics and 
evaluation, which in turn should help to drive up standards. The review will also 
need to consider how the appropriate incentives for both investors and delivery 
bodies can best work, and consider who exactly needs to take on any risk. 
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29. PBR places a greater responsibility on those commissioning services to be 
rigorous about the outcomes they want, whilst putting in place an incentive 
system to ensure the provider delivers these outcomes in the most cost-effective 
and innovative way. Clearly this has the potential to deliver cash savings for the 
Commissioner, profits for the provider and better public services for the end user.  
30. We believe, at this stage in our thinking, that such a model is likely to underpin 
any financial mechanisms which we will recommend. This is because they enable 
transfer of risk out of the public sector, and therefore help to justify the greater 
expense of using private sector finance. Social impact bonds represent one of 
the mechanisms which we will explore in particular, considering how these could 
be adapted to attract private sector investors. We will need to explore the types 
of outcomes that could be used to determine successful performance that 
triggers payment. 
 
b. Types of Finance 
 
31. We will consider a full range of financial mechanisms across the spectrum, 
including equity, debt, and hybrid products. A brief description of these is set out 
below 
 
Type of finance mechanism: Includes consideration of: 
Equity / Quasi-equity:  
Pros: Most appropriate form of finance 
where risk is perceived to be greater by 
investors. Attractive as investors only 
receive a dividend upon successful 
performance, and transfers risk to the 
private sector. Also could help to draw in 
other forms of finance (e.g. debt) through 
strengthening of balance sheets, as it 
can provide investors with greater 
confidence.  
Cons:However, can be expensive form of 
finance in order to reward investors for 
risks taken, and requires consideration of 
what exactly investors would buy a 
„stake‟ in. 
 Venture capital models, where 
investors buy a share or a stake 
(of a fund, organisation, or 
programme), and are paid a 
dividend only upon successful 
performance 
 Mutuals & cooperatives, and the 
options for investors buying stakes 
in these. 
 Quasi-equity such as social impact 
bonds, or consideration of whether 
simpler form of payment by results 
contract is more appropriate. 
 Franchising could operate in 
respect of individual programmes, 
with a national institution 
supporting development of 
programmes for wider roll-out. 
 ISAs as a means of allowing 
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savers to invest in organisations 
which support delivery of early 
intervention, or to buy a stake in a 
national fund 
Debt:  
Pros: Attractive as usually simple and 
cheaper form of finance. It can also be 
combined with equity for a stronger 
balance sheet. 
Cons: However, it may be less 
appropriate for Early Intervention given 
the lack of track record of Early 
Intervention programmes for investors. 
Debt is possibly a less attractive option 
as those receiving it are required to pay it 
back, usually in addition to an interest 
payment or coupon. It therefore sits on 
the public sector balance sheet and 
increases the fiscal deficit.  
 Local government bonds, which 
local government can already 
issue, but have historically been 
expensive in comparison to 
borrowing from the PWLB. Often 
the costs of issuance are too 
prohibitive for a single area to 
issue a relatively small bond.  
 Prudential borrowing rules, for 
instance restrict what local 
authorities can borrow for (i.e. 
capital borrowing only), and the 
time period over which they can 
do so. This is of particular impact 
for Early Intervention, where the 
benefits occur over longer 
timeframes.   
 Retail bonds could provide a 
potentially attractive option for 
high net worth individuals 
interested in supporting Early 
Intervention, either on a 
Government or private sector 
basis. 
 Consideration of the IFFIm model 
for Bond Issuance. 
 
Hybrid (Debt & Equity):  
Pros: Attractive as can help to lever-in 
greater levels of investment, and takes 
account of different expectations and 
needs of different types of investors. Can 
also help to reduce risk of default, and 
should therefore reduce costs of finance.  
Cons: However is a more complex 
structure. Creation of any equity buffer to 
back-up debt could perhaps be better put 
 Hybrid models drawing on debt 
and equity. For instance we could 
create a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) using Philanthropic equity 
to help lever in additional 
commercial debt. Similarly any 
equity investment could be used 
as a „buffer‟, to protect against 
default of debt. 
 Evolving models depending on 
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to use in a pure equity type vehicle. stage of programme delivery.For 
example, at the outset of a new 
programme being established, it 
might be that equity finance is 
most appropriate given the greater 
risks involved. Once a programme 
is up and running however, it may 
be that a debt-type model is more 
suitable. It may also be that a 
hybrid product is needed to help 
meet the needs of different types 
of investors, depending on their 
risk appetite. 
 Consider whether Community 
Budgets could provide a possible 
tranche of any hybrid structure 
 
 
c. Scale 
32. Different models will be applicable depending on the size of the investment 
sought. So for instance different models could apply at local, regional or national 
level. At local level, the costs associated with some financial mechanisms may 
simply be too prohibitive (for instance legal fees, credit ratings, etc). A national 
level fund for instance could help to overcome some of these costs, and will 
probably be necessary if we are to establish an effective market with sufficient 
liquidity for investors. However creating a „one size fits all‟ approach might not be 
attractive to everyone. We will therefore aim to explore mechanisms which could 
operate at different levels of scale. 
 
d. Programmes, cohorts, and organisations 
 
33. In considering different mechanisms, it will be important to establish whether we 
are seeking investors to put money into specific programmes, into a social 
enterprise which delivers Early Intervention policy, or into a cohort of individuals 
with whom you want to deliver certain outcomes. It could also be possible to have 
a mechanism which combines different elements of these options. In all cases, 
the focus needs to be on delivery of successful outcomes.  
34. In the case of programmes, investment would relate to outcomes delivered by a 
specific programme or portfolio of programmes. This has the advantage of 
incentivising a single provider to deliver outcomes. However it requires a strict 
adherence to the programmes over a potentially long time period. This does not 
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allow for any flexibility, and could pose problems should more effective 
programmes be developed in the interim.  
35. In the case of organisations, investment would be linked to outcomes delivered 
by a particular social enterprise. Often social enterprises can lack the means for 
growing their organisation, so that they are better able to deliver their 
programmes to a greater number of people. Supporting these organisations would 
help to create a greater number of delivery agents, who are able to provide 
programmes on a more sustainable basis. However this model tends to work best 
for those organisations that operate outside of local or central government, and 
we will need to consider how it could be applied across the range of delivery 
organisations who work at local level. 
36. In the case of a cohort of individuals, investment would be linked to outcomes 
achieved with a specific group of individuals, and would be agnostic to the 
programmes used to achieve these outcomes. This has the advantage of 
providing a more flexible approach, ensuring that the cohort can benefit from the 
most effective programmes in existence at the time. This is the model currently 
being tested through social impact bonds with prisoners in Peterborough. 
However, whilst it is often the case that a single provider could be responsible for 
delivering multiple programmes to a group of individuals in a prison, this is less 
likely to be the case with Early Intervention where the local authority normally 
commissions multiple providers.  
 
e. Investor groups 
 
37. Our work in Part 2 of the review will also consider the different investor groups 
who might be interested in specific products. In particular we will explore 
mechanisms which are attractive to financial institutions and investors, in the 
hope of drawing in resources of greater scale on a more sustainable basis. The 
following groups of investors will be considered:   
 Financial institutions (Investment banks, retail banks, etc) 
 Financial investors (venture capitalists, etc) 
 Retail investors (ordinary individuals) 
 Ethical investors 
 Endowment capital from foundations 
 Philanthropic investors 
 Charitable sector 
 Business sector 
 Private sector bodies who deliver for Government already (i.e. Serco) 
 Public sector investment 
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38. We will need to explore the motivations and incentives that will attract these 
different groups, and understand the different rates of return that they would be 
willing to take in order to help drive better outcomes in Early Intervention. For 
instance a charitable organisation will probably not require as high a rate of return 
(if indeed one at all) as a financial investor, as their core purpose may be to 
promote Early Intervention in any case. 
39. Ensuring that we can help to create a market in Early Intervention products will be 
important in attracting additional investors of all kinds. However we will need to 
weigh up the relative benefits of attracting those who require greater returns, 
alongside those who historically have not required any return. In particular we do 
not want to create a model that ends up being more expensive to the public 
sector, providing returns to those who do not seek them, and failing to attract 
those who require higher returns. 
 
f. Tax incentives 
40. Whilst we are mindful of the public spending implications of providing tax 
incentives, this should not rule out consideration of the possibilities in areas such 
as ISAs or exploring local tax policy. For instance, we will consider the role of 
Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs which help to offer loans 
and investment to social enterprises at local level), given that they are currently 
positioned to offer community investment tax relief (CITF) for investors.  If the 
Government is serious about external finance having a stronger role in public 
services, then the tax incentives to facilitate this should be fully considered, 
particularly if this investment will bring about greater public savings. 
 
i. Role of Institution 
41. Part 1 of the report sets out the recommendation for a new Early Intervention 
institution at national level. In considering the mechanisms as described above, 
we will also explore how a national institution might best support these, including: 
 Act as an advocate for Early Intervention - Demonstrate the benefits of 
Early Intervention to investors, providing a credible source of expertise for 
them.  
 Awareness raising – providing both investors and local areas with greater 
awareness of the number of finance options that might be available to them. 
 Critical mass – provide greater economies of scale. For instance an individual 
area may not be able to absorb the costs associated with establishing 
particular financial mechanisms. The institution could either absorb these itself 
across a number of different areas, or help to bring together areas seeking to 
deliver similar programmes and thus enabling them to better meet costs 
between themselves. Similarly, the institution could help to diversify investor 
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risks across a number of different programmes, thus reducing risks and the 
level of returns required. 
 Act as a broker for investors and local areas - One of the core roles of the 
institution will be to bring together the investor community, with robust 
evidence-based delivery programmes requiring additional funding. 
 Hub for evidence based programmes – helping to reduce risk for investors 
by ensuring that their money only goes into programmes which are robust and 
likely to produce successful outcomes. This could include development of 
robust metrics for assessing outcomes, for the purposes of paying investors.  
 
42. There will be a range of additional considerations that will need to be taken into 
account when considering the role of the institution. We will need to: 
 Explore for instance how the finance arm of the foundation should best be 
structured to comply with state aid, accounting, regulatory and other relevant 
considerations. 
 Consider the nature of links with other similar entities, such as Big Society 
Bank. 
 Ensure that there is sufficient separation between the financial and best 
practice arms of the institution, to prevent any conflict of interest from arising. 
 Consider how it could become self-sustaining 
 Explore the most appropriate governance and leadership options 
 Set out the relationship of the institution with Government 
 
 
Conclusions 
This document has set out the problem we are trying to address, and the key areas 
we will explore in order to come up with some credible solutions. We will continue to 
work closely with the financial and investor community as we develop our 
recommendations. If you are interested in being involved then please contact the 
Review Team on EIFinancingAllenReview@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk 
 
 
